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This paper is based on a review of the board composition of material Commonwealth 
Statutory Authorities with particular focus on the profile of non-executive directors.  The 
analysis examines the mix of non-executive directors gender, remuneration, length of 
board membership and the number of other directorships held and  
 
The paper will review the roles of directors and outline a number of additional 
requirements these directors have in comparison to directors of private sector 
organisations and highlight the paradoxial requirement of independence. The paper 
concludes questioning the need for independent directors (if there are any) on the boards 




The Australian Commonwealth Public Service has, like the private sector, increased 
significantly its focus on the corporate governance arrangements of Government, 
government departments, agencies and statutory authorities.  Corporate governance can 
be defined simply as the system by which organisations are directed, controlled and 
managed (ASX 2003; O’Regan et al 2005).  A more precise definition, developed by the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) which has been adopted by the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) for Commonwealth Public Sector Annual Reports, 
states that “corporate governance refers to the processes by which organisations are 
directed, controlled and held to account. It encompasses authority, accountability, 
stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the organisation. (ANAO, 
2003a, p.6)  This definition of public sector corporate governance is supported by Uhrig 
in his 2003 report on corporate governance of Statutory Authorities by explaining it is 
concerned with “the power of those in control of the strategy and direction of an entity  
……  taking into account risk and the environment in which it is operating.” (2003, p.2)  
 
Public sector corporate governance structures are generally considered to no different 
than the corporate governance structures in the private sector.  This belief has led to a 
significant push, over the past decade, for the public sector to adopt private sector 
corporate governance processes and structures (Edwards 2002, p.52).   
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One of the key processes required to be undertaken to develop an effective corporate 
governance structure of on organisation is the clarification of appropriate roles for 
management and for the board of directors (ASX 2003, p.3).  However, while the roles 
and powers of directors on public sector boards appear similar to those of directors on 
private sector boards there are significant fundamental differences.  The most significant 
difference is in relation to the level of power of directors “a key characteristic of a board 
in a public company is its full power to act and its responsibility to do so.  This includes 
the approval of strategy and direction for the business and important company policies, as 
well as overseeing the performance of management”. (Uhrig 2003, p.4)  However a board 
in the public sector has limited power due, primarily to the fact government organisations 
are created for the implementation of established policy and the delivery of intended 
outcomes based on government policies. (Uhrig 2003, p.31)  The real power in a public 
sector organisation rests not with the board of directors but with the responsible Minister 
as he or she controls the appointment of board members and can therefore influence the 
behaviour of board members and reduce the autonomy of boards. (Howard and Seth-
Purdie, 2005 p.60)  The Minister is provided by legislation certain powers over the 
organisation that can significantly impact on the level of autonomy of public sector 
boards.  For example under sections 28 and 43 of the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Corporations Act 1997 (CAC Act)  the Minister has the power to provide, after 
consultation with the board, written notification to the board about general government 
policy which the board is obliged to ensure is carried out. (ANAO 2003b, p.3)  The 
Minister also has the authority to appoint, long with other board members, the CEO or 
Managing Director.  The former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Finance and 
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Administration (DoFA) Professor Steven Bartos explains that “the power to appoint or 
remove CEOs is one of the most prized powers of government.” (Bartos 2005, p.96)  It is 
also worth considering when examining the effectiveness and independence of a public 
sector board that the minister also has the “the power of the purse, through portfolio 
budget allocations”. (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005 p59) 
 
Regardless of the level of power and autonomy of public sector boards they still need to 
ensure the corporate governance structures of their organisations allows them to 
effectively meet their responsibilities to their key stakeholders.  To assist the Australian 
National Audit Office (ANAO) has developed comprehensive Better Practice Guides, for 
use amongst the public sector, that outlines quite explicitly the frameworks, processes 
and practices government organisations should take to ensure their corporate government 
arrangements meet the expectations of their key stakeholders to effectively discharge 
their accountabilities.  There is also a number of pieces of specific legislation developed 
for Commonwealth Government entities which prescribe the required processes and 
functions that affect the governance of these entities.  The main pieces of legislation 
include the Auditor-General Act 1997, the Public Service Act 1999 (PS Act), the 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) and the Corporations Act 2001. (ANAO 
2003 a, p.10)   
 
Background: Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) 
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The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) was developed to 
regulate the financial reporting and accountability of Commonwealth Statutory 
Authorities and Commonwealth Companies.  Commonwealth Statutory Authorities are 
body corporates, that hold money on their own account, incorporated for a public purpose 
by Act or by regulations under an Act. (CAC Act ss.7)  Commonwealth Companies are 
Corporations Act 2001 companies in which the Commonwealth has a controlling interest (ss 34).  
The CAC Act “has reporting requirements and other requirements that apply in addition to 
the requirements of the Corporations Act 2001”. (CAC Act page 1)   
 
The creation of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Commonwealth Companies is 
based on various decisions made by government where it is considered more appropriate 
for government controlled entities to operate “outside a traditional departmental 
structure” (Uhrig 2003 p.16)  To ensure these detached organisations operate effectively 
and in line with government expectations the majority of Commonwealth Statutory 
Authorities have a governing body such as a council or board where the members of the 
governing body are defined as directors. (CAC Act, ss 5).  The role of directors, who are 
selected and appointed by the responsible Minister, of Statutory Authorities which are 
Commonwealth authorities for CAC Act 1997 purposes is rather more complex than 
those for public corporations.  They are subject to similar requirements as specified for 
directors of public companies in the Corporations Act 2001.  For example Section 27E of 
the CAC Act 1997 states: 
If the directors of a Commonwealth authority delegate a power under its enabling 
legislation, a director is responsible for the exercise of the power by the delegate 
as if the power had been exercised by the directors themselves. 
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which is comparable to section 198D of the Corporations Act 2001: 
The directors of a company may delegate any of their powers  …..  the exercise of 
the power by the delegate is as effective as if the directors had exercised it. 
However there are also additional requirements directors of Statutory Authorities outlined 
in the CAC Act 1997.   
 
The directors of a CAC Act 1997 statutory authority in addition to preparing an annual 
report, which is eventually tabled in Parliament, and forwarding the completed annual 
report to the responsible Minister (CAC Act 1997, ss.9) the directors are also required to 
prepare budget estimates for each financial year. (ss.14)  The budget estimates are 
estimates of the proposed annual expenditure of the statutory authority and they are 
referred, via the Government to one of the Senate’s legislation committees for 
examination and report.  These legislation committees consist of six senators, three from 
the government (one of whom is the committee chair), two from the opposition, and one 
representing the minority parties or independents (Senate, Brief 5). Harry Evans (2004), 
Clerk of the Senate, explains that the legislation committees’ scrutiny of the estimates 
provides an opportunity for the Senate to assess the performance of the public service and 
its administration of government policy and programs.  The review of the budget 
estimates is one of the most important accountability functions of the Parliament and 
therefore the directors must not fail to provide the responsible Minister with the Budget 
Estimates by the required deadline. 
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Sections 16 and 17 of the CAC Act 1997 outline the additional requirements of directors 
of a statutory authority including they must inform the Minister of the operations of the 
authority and provide the minister and the Finance Minister reports, documents and 
information as the Ministers’ require (ss.16) and they must also, each year, prepare a 
corporate plan which includes the objectives of the authority , business assumptions 
based on the organisation’s operating environment as well as the organisation’s price and 
quality control strategies and community service obligations. (ss.17) 
 
Like directors of public companies the directors of statutory authorities are legally 
required to ensure the financial statements of the organisation are audited by an 
appropriately qualified auditor.  However the directors of the statutory don’t have a 
choice of auditor, rather  
… the directors of a Commonwealth authority must do whatever is necessary to 
ensure that all relevant subsidiary’s financial statements are audited by the 
Auditor-General. (section 12, (1)) 
To support this requirement the CACAct1997 (ss.12.3) states the Auditor-General must 




There are 71 statutory authorities which are Commonwealth Authorities for CAC Act 
purposes – as at 4 December 2006 – of which 25 are defined as material entities as they 
comprise 99% of revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities (DoFA .   )  From the 25 
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material Commonwealth Statutory Authorities 19 were selected for this review.  The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) was excluded as it operates 
under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), while the 
Australian Government Solicitor, Comcare, and the Civil Aviation Authority were 
excluded as they have a single person at the apex of the body rather than a multi-member 
board.  (DoFA    ).  The Australian Industry Development Corporation and Coal Mining 
Industry (Long Service Leave Funding) Corporation were also excluded. 
 
The 19 Statutory Authorities in the review had a total on 176 directors which equates to 
an average number of over 9 directors per Statutory Authority board which is consistent 
with the findings of the Higg’s  2003 report “the board should be of sufficient size that 
the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirement of the business” 
(p.22).  One of the better practice recommendations of the Uhrig report (2003) is “the 
board size should be developed taking into consideration factors such as an entity’s size, 
complexity, risk of operations and the needs of the board”.  The ASX Corporate 
Governance Principle 2 summarises that the size of the board should be conducive to 
encourage expedient and efficient decision making. (2003, p.22)  These three reports 
indicate that it is not necessary to prescribe a definite board size but rather a decision 
based on individual organizational needs is advised.  The other important 
recommendation of these reports is that the majority of directors should be non-executive 
directors.  The justification for this recommendation is that the greater the number of non-
executive directors the greater the level of independence the directors.  
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The 2005 -06 Annual Report for each of the 19 Statutory Authorities was used to collect 
the following information: 
• Number of directors 
• Mix of executive and non-executive directors 
• Gender of directors 
• Average length of service of directors 
• Highest level of qualification of directors 
• Remuneration of non-executive directors 
• Number of other directorships 
 




Of the 176 directors 161 (91%) could be classified as non-executive directors (NED), 
however of these 161 directors 23 are also current senior public servants and are 
considered to be non-independent non-executive directors (Non Ind).  These non-
independent non-executive directors include senior departmental officers as well as 
current members of parliament.  They are primarily on the board to represent the interests 
of the major stakeholders of the Statutory Authority, the Commonwealth Government 
and Parliament.  For example Senator George Bandis (member of the Government) and 
Martin Ferguson MP (member of the Opposition) are both on the board of the National 
Library and their presence  would be to ensure the interests of Parliament are represented.  
An example of a current senior public servant having a representational position on the 
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board of a Statutory Authority is Ms Lisa Paul, Secretary of Department of Science, 
Education and Training (DEST).  Ms Paul is also a director on the board of the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) which also 
happens to be a Statutory Authority within her –DEST’s – portfolio.  This high level of 
non-independent directors was criticised in the Uhrig report because representational 
appointments have the potential to place the success of the entity at risk.(2003, p.13)  
Howard and Seth-Purdie support this criticism by commenting “having the portfolio 
secretary as an ex-officio member of the board, regardless of whether the position carries 
voting rights, is a further complication, particularly when financial matters are at stake.” 
(Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005 p56-57)   
 
Take in table 1 
 
The results from table 1 are consistent with the recommendations of the Higg’s report “at 
least half of the members of the board, excluding the chairman, should be independent 
non-executive directors” (2003, p.35) and the ASX Essential Corporate Governance 
Principles “a majority of the board should be independent directors”. (2003, p.19)  
 
Table 2 reports the gender mix of non-executive directors and executive directors.  The 
portion of female non-executive directors (29%) is significantly higher than comparable 
studies of non-executive directors in the private sector.  Li and Wearing’s (2004) study 
reported female non-executive directors only made 6% of non-executive directors in the 
top 350 UK listed companies.  Pass (2004) reported a slightly higher portion of female 
non-executive directors in large UK companies (11%) while Cortese and Bowrey’s 
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(2007) study of the top 50 Australian listed companies (ASX 50) found 16% of non-
executive directors were female. 
 
Take in table 2 
 
Even more significant than the larger proportion of female non-executive directors is the 
fact that all statutory authority boards in the study had one or more female non-executive 
directors.  This is significant when comparing to Pass’s (2004) study which showed only 
58 percent of UK companies had one or more female board members while the Cortese 
and Bowrey (2007) study indicated only 83% had one or more female board members. 
 
 
The qualifications of 113 directors could be determined from the various Statutory 
Authorities annual reports (64% of the sample).  Table 3 shows the split of the highest 
level of formal qualifications these 113 directors have attained.   
 
Take in table 3 
 
It is apparent from the data most directors have some level of tertiary qualifications. Of 
the directors with post graduate qualifications a significant proportion 19 (25%) have 
been awarded PhDs with remainder holders of Masters degrees and or professional 
qualifications such as CPA Australia status.   
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The length of service of non-executive directors has also been identified as a possible key 
indicator of board performance and level of independence.  The ASX listing rules suggest 
non-executive directors should serve on a board only for a period time where it would not 
interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company.  (ASX, 
2003, p.20).  This view is reflected in Uhrig’s (2003) report where it was suggested a 
maximum board service period be set so as to allow for appropriate rotation of directors.   
Higg’s came to the conclusion that non-executive directors could appropriately serve two 
three-year terms with a company however it would be questionable the value for a non-
executive director serving longer. (2003, p.53) 
 
Take in table 4 
 
Table 4 shows the average length of service of non-executive directors in the sample 
Statutory Authorities to be 4.5 years which is similar to the findings of the comparable 
study of ASX50 corporations (Cortese and Bowrey 2007).  There is some concern with 
approximately 8% of non-executive directors in the sample being members of their 
respective boards for 10 or more years.  This length of service could present problems, 
particularly in relation to the independence of non-executive directors, “the substantial 
length of time served by some non-executive directors could reasonably be perceived to 
interfere with the independence of these board members” (ASX, 2003, p.20) 
 
The most obvious difference between non-executive directors of Commonwealth 
Statutory Authorities and private sector companies is the level of remuneration for non-
executive directors.  Cortese and Bowrey (2007) found that the majority of the ASX50 
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companies provided their non-executive directors with average remuneration in excess of 
$140,000.  Table 5 shows the majority (68%) of non-executive directors in the sample 
received remuneration between $15,000 and $45,000 per year with the average level of 
remuneration $32,000.   
 
Take in table 5 
 
Excluded from the above table is the average level of remuneration for the non-executive 
directors of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) board.  This is because the RBA’s 
2005-06 Annual Report only discloses in the financial notes (Note 12, p.85) the 
consolidated remuneration of Key Management Personnel which includes the Governor 
and Deputy Governor, 8 non-executive RBA Board members, 5 non-executive Payments 
System Board members and 5 senior staff.  Even though the RBA is a Statutory Authority 
operating under the CAC Act 1997 it is surprising it was not possible to identify 
separately the remuneration of board members. The ASX Essential Corporate 
Governance Principle 9 (ASX 2003) requires the disclosure of non-executive directors’ 
remuneration to be clear and adequately distinguished from the remuneration structure 
applied to company executives.  
 
Also not included in the above table is the remuneration of non-independent non-
executive directors, senior public servants and members of parliament, as they do not 
receive any remuneration for their directorships on Statutory Authorities boards.  This is 
generally made clear in the notes to the financial statements, for example in the National 
15 
Library of Australia 2005-06 Annual Report Note 13 (page 115) states “Parliamentary 
members of Council do not receive any remuneration from the Library for their service 
on Council” 
 
The data collected shows 84 directors of Statutory Authorities (48% of the sample) held 
at least one other directorship.   
 
Take in table 6 
 
However, of all the directors in the sample only five hold at least one other directorship 
with another Statutory Authority.  Two of which are non-independent non-executive 
directors, Mark Paterson Secretary of the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
(DITR)  and Helen Williams Secretary of Secretary Department of Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA).  This tends to indicate the non-executive 
directors of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities are able to contribute a significant 
amount of private sector corporate experience to their roles on the boards of Statutory 
Authorities.  However, whilst on the surface private sector experience would be 
invaluable to the boards of Statutory Authorities Howard and Seth-Purdy (2005) found, 
through their interviews of non-executive directors, a number of non-executive directors 
initially struggled adapting to the processes and functions of public sector organisations. 
 




The boards of directors of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities are unique in a number 
of different ways when compared to the boards of the public companies.  On the surface 
they appear similar, for example they are similar in size and composition, but scratch 
away at the surface and a range of different characteristics and requirements become 
apparent.  In public companies there is a definite drive to increase the proportion of non-
executive directors in the hope the level of independence of the board from the 
management of the organisation is improved.  However, independence does not appear to 
be a characteristic required nor encouraged for directors of Statutory Authorities.  The 
findings from this small study indicate the proportion of non-executive directors is 
comparable if not higher than public corporation boards, but the fact the Minister selects 
and appoints (or recommends for appointment) negates the superficial independence of 




Besides executive and non-executive directors some boards of Commonwealth Statutory 
Authorities also include non-independent non-executive directors who are literally 
representational directors.  These directors are either senior public servants or members 
of parliament.  Their role is to represent the government or parliament and protect their 
interests, rather than participate for the benefit of the Statutory Authority.  For example 
Ms Helen Williams who is the Secretary of the Department of Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) sits on the boards of National Library of 
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Australia and the Australian Sports Commission.  Both of these Statutory Authorities 
come under the umbrella of her portfolio department (DCITA).  This presents an 
interesting position, for not only does Ms Williams sit on the board and assist in 
preparing and signing-off the Annual Reports and Budget Estimates of these two 
Statutory Authorities, she also has the role of Secretary of DCITA with responsibilities 
which include considering funding requests from these statutory authorities.  Howard and 
Seth-Purdie summarise this interesting position as “a secretary would be simultaneously 
policy advisor to the minister, major client of the authority and authority board member”. 
(2005, p.62)  The situation complements the independence paradox created by the need of 
independent directors, in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, to rely heavily on 
the information provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be 
independent Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004).  
 
The other glaring conflict within the current public sector governance structure is the due 
to the power of the responsible Minister over the Commonwealth Statutory Authority.  
As outlined above, the Minister appoints board members, can direct the board to comply 
with general government policies (ss.28 of the CAC Act) as well as determine the overall 
strategy of the authority (Uhrig 2003, p.35).  Where is the independence and autonomy of 
the board?  Uhrig commented that the power to act is essential to a board’s ability to 
govern effectively (2003, p.23) however due to the powers of the responsible Minister it 
appears the boards of Statutory Authorities are not able to govern effectively as they do 
not have the power to act with autonomy.  
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Appendix 1:  Statutory Authorities included in the analysis 
 
Statutory Authority Portfolio 
Grains Research and Development Corporation Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Australian Postal Corporation Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Australian Sports Commission Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
National Gallery of Australia Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
National Library of Australia Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
National Museum of Australia Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Special Broadcasting Service Corporation (SBS) Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Defence Housing Australia (DHA) Defence 
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 
Organisation (ANSTO) 
Education, Science and Training 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO) 
Education, Science and Training 
Indigenous Business Australia Employment and Workplace Relations 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Australian Hearing Services Human Services 
Tourism Australia Industry, Tourism and Resources 
Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation Treasury 
Reserve Bank of Australia Treasury 
Australian War Memorial Veteran’s Affairs 




The Uhrig Report 2003 - Summary of Better Practice Guidance for Boards 
1. Board size should be developed taking into consideration factors such as an 
entity’s size, complexity, risk of operations and the needs of the board. 
 
2. Committees are a useful mechanism for the board to enhance its effectiveness 
through further detailed oversight and supervision of the management of risks that 
are critical to the success of the entity. Committees should be used only for this 
purpose. 
 
3. In getting the best from boards, appropriately experienced directors are critical to 
good governance. 
 
4. Representational appointments to boards have the potential to place the success of 
the entity at risk. 
 
5. Responsible Ministers should issue appointment letters detailing government 
expectations of directors. 
 
6. Maximum board service periods allow for a structured rotation of directors. 
 
7. All boards should have orientation programs and directors should have the 
opportunity for ongoing professional development. 
 
8. Annual assessments of the board need to occur to ensure government gets the best 
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